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Abstract Abstraction principles and grounding can be combined in a natural
way ([Ros10, 117]; [Sch11, 362]). However, some ground-theoretic abstraction
principles entail that there are circles of partial ground ([Don17, 793]). I call
this problem auto-abstraction. In this paper I sketch a solution. Sections 1 and
2 are introductory. In section 3 I start comparing different solutions to the
problem. In section 4 I contend that the thesis that the right-hand side of an
abstraction principle is (metaphysically) prior to its left-hand side motivates an
independence constraint, and that this constraint leads to predicative restric-
tions on the acceptable instances of ground-theoretic abstraction principles.
In section 5 I argue that auto-abstraction is acceptable unless the left-hand
side is essentially grounded by the right-hand side. In section 6 I highlight sev-
eral parallelisms between auto-abstraction and the puzzles of ground. I finally
compare my solution with the strategies listed in section 3.
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1 Introduction
The two leading actors in this paper will be abstraction principles and ground-
ing.
An abstraction principle is a universally quantified biconditional of the
following form:
∀α∀β (Abs(α) = Abs(β)↔ α ∼ β) (AP)
where α and β are variables of the same type (e.g. first-order or second-order),
‘Abs’ is a term-forming operator that denotes a function from entities of the
type of α and β to objects, and ∼ is an equivalence1 relation over entities of
that type. Informally, an abstraction principle states that α and β have the
same abstract just in case they belong to the same equivalence class.
To give an example, [Fre50, 74] formulates an abstraction principle for
directions which asserts that two lines a and b have the same direction if and
only if they are parallel:
∀a∀b (Dir(a) = Dir(b)↔ a//b) (Dir)
Abstraction principles are familiar from neo-Fregeanism in the philosophy of
mathematics ([Wri83], [HW01]). Neo-Fregeans attempt to provide a founda-
tion for arithmetic on the basis of Hume’s Principle (HP), a (second-level2)
abstraction principle stating that for any two concepts F and G, the cardinal
number of F is identical with the cardinal number of G just in case F and
G are equinumerous, i.e. if and only the F ’s and the G’s can be put into
one-to-one correspondence:
∀F∀G (#(F ) = #(G)↔ F ≈ G) (HP)
HP is sufficient to derive all the standard axioms of second-order Dedekind-
Peano Arithmetic in fully impredicative3 second-order logic with identity and
via natural definitions of the arithmetical primitives. This result is now known
as Frege’s Theorem.
The notion of grounding is similarly familiar from the recent literature in
metaphysics (for introduction, see [CS12], [CL12]). Intuitively, not everything
that exists is metaphysically on a par; by contrast, the world appears to have
some of the features that it has in virtue of it having some others. For example,
biological facts arguably obtain in virtue of biochemical facts, and biochemical
facts arguably obtain in virtue of micro-physical facts. Many have recently
argued that non-causal explanations of this sort should be analysed in terms
of a (primitive) notion of metaphysical dependence or grounding, rather than
in other (e.g. modal) terms (cf. [Sch09], [Ros10], [Aud12], [Fin12]).
1i.e. reflexive, symmetric, and transitive.
2An abstraction principle is first-level if the abstraction operator applies to first-order vari-
ables, e.g. (Dir), and second level if the operator applies to second-order variables, e.g
HP.
3The second-order comprehension axiom is impredicative if the comprehension formula φ(x)
can contain second-order variables, and predicative otherwise.
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Abstraction principles and grounding can be combined in a natural way
([Ros10, 177]; [Sch11, 362]). Recall that an abstraction principle states that
two items (e.g. lines a and b) have the same abstract (e.g. the same direction)
just in case those items stand in a given equivalence relation (e.g. if and only if
they are parallel). It is natural to think that two items have the same abstract
in virtue of the fact that those items stand in the relevant relation (e.g. a
and b have the same direction because they are parallel). Suppose that at
least some of those items are concrete entities, and that their abstracts are, by
contrast, mathematical objects, for example numbers. The notion of grounding
would then place mathematical entities higher than non-mathematical ones in
the metaphysical structure. This might suggest a form of aristotelianism in
the philosophy of mathematics, according to which numbers exist and have
their properties exclusively in virtue of some non-mathematical facts4 ([Ros11];
[Ros16]; [Sch11, 354]; [Don17, 775-6]).
2 Auto-abstraction
However, some abstraction principles might be problematic from the point of
view of the theory of grounding.
The most straightforward way of formulating a ground-theoretic abstraction
principle is by means of a conditional with the following form:
∀α∀β (Abs(α) = Abs(α)→ ([α ∼ β] < [Abs(α) = Abs(β)])) (GAP)
(read: if the abstract of α is identical with the abstract of β, then the fact that
α ∼ β grounds the fact that the abstract of α = the abstract of β), where the
symbol ‘<’ stands for full5, immediate6, and strict7 grounding between facts8.
For example, the ground-theoretic version of HP would be as follows:
∀F∀G (#(F ) = #(G)→ ([F ≈ G] < [#(F ) = #(G)])), (GHP)
(read: if the number of F is identical with the number of G, then the fact that
F ≈ G grounds the fact that the number of F = the number of G).
Ground-theoretic abstraction principles must be stated as conditionals be-
cause grounding is a factive notion, i.e. [A] < [B] entails both that it is the
4Aristotelianism bears great significance for the discussion whether a form of physicalism,
understood as the claim that everything is either physical or grounded in the physical, is
true; I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer at Synthese for drawning my attention to
this.
5A set of facts Γ fully grounds a fact [A] if the former provide a completely satisfactory
metaphysical explanation of the latter, while Γ partially grounds [A] if the former helps
grounding the latter.
6A set of facts Γ immediately grounds [A] iff there is no fact “in between” the ground and
the grounded; Γ mediately grounds [A] otherwise.
7A set of facts Γ strictly grounds [A] if for any set of facts ∆ that contains [A], there is no
fact [B] ∈ Γ that is mediately grounded by ∆.
8We adopt the convention of enclosing full sentences in squared brackets as a device to
indicate facts.
4 Luca Zanetti
case that A and that it is the case that B; without the appropriate conditional
form, the ground-theoretic version of HP would have the absurd consequence
that each concept is equinumerous with any other ([Sch11, p. 362, fn. 18]).
Moreover, GHP does not account for numerical inequalities, i.e. each case
in which the numbers of two concepts are not the same. However, HP states
that the equinumerosity of two concepts is sufficient and necessary for the
identity of the cardinal numbers of those concepts; therefore, it is natural to
extend SRP in in this way:
∀F∀G (#(F ) = #(G)→ ([F ≈ G] < [#(F ) = #(G)]) ∧
#(F ) 6= #(G)→ ([F 6≈ G] < [#(F ) 6= #(G)]))
Finally, GHP has different consequences depending on how finely the numer-
ical identities on the left of HP are individuated. [Don17, 784-5] distinguishes
between two views:
(i) [#(F ) = #(G)] has two concepts, i.e. F and G, the cardinality operator,
and the identity relation as constituents;
(ii) [#(F ) = #(G)] have an object, i.e. the cardinal number of F and G, and
the identity relation as constituents.
Donaldson labels (i) the “fine view” and (ii) the “coarse view”9. If the fine view
is adopted, GHP delivers an account of what grounds numerical identities of
the form [#(F ) = #(G)], but fails to explain what grounds numerical identities
of the form [x = y]. By contrast, if the coarse view is adopted, GHP fails to
provide an account of what grounds contingent numerical identities (e.g. the
number of Jupiter’s moons = the number of the horses pulling the cart; cp.
[Fre50, §57]), since those identities would be the same as necessary identities
such as 4 = 4. Donaldson suggests that the aristotelian should adopt the fine
view and that GHP should be modified as follows:
For all x, y, F , G, if x = #(F ) and y = #(G) and x = y, then each
one of the facts [#(F ) = #(G)], [x = #(F )], [y = #(G)] and [x = y] is
fully grounded by [F ≈ G];
For all x, y, F , G, if x = #(F ) and y = #(G) and x 6= y, then each
one of the facts [#(F ) 6= #(G)], [x 6= #(G)], [y 6= #(F )] and [x 6= y] is
fully grounded by [F 6≈ G].10
For example, suppose that there are as many species of Flamingo as there are
cities in Wales (this exotic example is due to [Don17, 792]). GHP entails that
the fact that the number of Flamingo species is the same as the number of
Welsh cities is grounded by the fact that those species and those cities can
be paired one-to-one. Assume, moreover, that there are exactly six species of
9An anonymous reviewer at Synthese pointed out to me that since the notion of grounding is
notoriously fine-grained, it is natural for the proponent of GHP to adopt a correspondingly
fine-grained conception of facts.
10[Don17, 785].
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Flamingo and exactly six cities in Wales. It would follow that the fact that
6 = 6 is grounded by the fact that there are as many species of Flamingo as
cities in Wales.
Consider however the following instance of HP, which states that the num-
ber of the concept identical with 1, px = 1q, is identical with itself if and only if
the things that are identical with 1 can be put into one-to-one correspondence
with themselves:
#(px = 1q) = #(px = 1q)↔ px = 1q ≈ px = 1q (1)
Note two things. First, it is natural to assume that a first-order universal quan-
tification is partially grounded by each one of its instances; we can therefore
adopt the following rule (cf. [Fin10, 100]; [Don17, 779]):
UNIVERSAL GROUNDING: If ∀x φ(x), infer: [∀x φ(x)] is fully
grounded by the set of facts of the form [φ(x)].
Second, each instance of HP involves first-order universal quantification on its
right. Indeed ‘F ≈ G’ abbreviates the (purely second-order logical) statement
that there is a relation R such that, for each F , there is exactly one G to which
that F bears R, and, for each G, there is exactly one F bearing R to that G
– formally,
∃R (∀x (F (x)→ ∃!y (G(y) ∧R(x, y))) ∧ ∀x (G(x)→ ∃!y (F (y) ∧R(y, x))))11
(≈)
Putting these two together, each instance of the right-hand side of HP will
therefore be partially grounded by facts concerning the objects that lie within
the range of its (first-order) quantifiers.
Here is why (1) is problematic. Following GHP, the left-hand side of (1) is
fully grounded by its right-hand side:
[px = 1q ≈ px = 1q] < [#(px = 1q) = #(px = 1q)]
As seen, the right-hand side of (1) is logical equivalent to a complex fact,
namely:
[∃R (∀x (x = 1→ ∃!y (y = 1∧R(x, y)))∧∀x (x = 1→ ∃!y (y = 1∧R(y, x))))]
The fact that there is a relation of one-to-one correspondence between two
concept F and G is plausibly grounded, for each such relation R, by the fact
that R(F,G). Let’s pick identity as a paradigmatic case of one-to-one corre-
spondence between two concepts; the right-hand side of (1) is fully grounded
by:
[∀x (x = 1→ ∃!y (y = 1 ∧ x = y)) ∧ ∀x (x = 1→ ∃!y (y = 1 ∧ y = x))]
Let’s consider the first conjunct first (the same considerations apply to the
second conjunct as well). Arguably, a conjunction A∧B is partially grounded
11‘∃x! φ(x)’ is defined as: ∃x(φ(x) ∧ ∀y (φ(y) → x = y)).
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by both A and B. Following UNIVERSAL GROUNDING, the first conjunct
is partially grounded by:
[a = 1→ ∃!y (y = 1 ∧ a = y)]
for each object a in the range of the first-order quantifiers featuring on the right
of (1). It is reasonable to assume that that a (material) conditional A→ B is
fully grounded either by ¬A or by B; [a = 1→ ∃!y (y = 1∧a = y)] is therefore
grounded by [∃!y (y = 1 ∧ a = y)]. Since the number 1 itself lies within the
range of the first-order quantifiers on the right of (1), then [∃!y (y = 1∧a = y)]
is partially grounded by:
[∃!y(y = 1 ∧ y = 1)]
We can also assume, in analogy with UNIVERSAL GROUNDING, that a
first-order existential quantification is fully grounded by each one of its in-
stances; [∃!y (y = 1 ∧ y = 1)] is therefore fully grounded by [1 = 1 ∧ 1 = 1],
and so by [1 = 1] alone.
Let’s introduce the symbol ‘≺’ for partial grounding. As seen, the right-
hand side of (1) turns out to be partially grounded by [1 = 1]:
[1 = 1] ≺ [px = 1q ≈ px = 1q]
At the same time, GHP entails that [px = 1q ≈ px = 1q] fully grounds the
left-hand side of (1), i.e. [1 = 1] (since the number of the things identical with
1 is 1 itself). Full grounding is usually taken to entail partial grounding ([?,
cf.]51]Fine2012); therefore we have that
[px = 1q ≈ px = 1q] ≺ [1 = 1]
By transitivity of partial grounding, [1 = 1] turns out to be partially grounded
by itself, contrary to the grounding orthodoxy, according to which partial
grounding is acyclic ([Don17, 793]). I shall call this problem auto-abstraction12.
I will proceed as follows. In section 3 I start comparing different solutions
to the problem. In section 4 I contend that the thesis that the right-hand
side of an abstraction principle is (metaphysically) prior to its left-hand side,
motivates an independence constraint, and that this constraint leads to pred-
icative restrictions on the acceptable instances of ground-theoretic abstraction
principles. In section 5 I argue that auto-abstraction is acceptable unless the
left-hand side is essentially grounded by the right-hand side. In section 6 I high-
light several parallelisms between auto-abstraction and the puzzles of ground.
I finally compare my solution with the strategies listed in section 3.
12I owe the label ‘auto-abstraction’ to Øyestein Linnebo.
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3 Priority
On the face of it, there seem to be three ways one might go in order to solve
the problem:
(a) restricting on which instances of HP can correspond to legitimate claims
of grounding;
(b) giving up on grounding irreflexivity;
(c) weakening UNIVERSAL GROUNDING.
In section 4 I argue that (a) leads directly to (c), so for now I will focus on (a)
and (b).
[Don17, 793-4] argues that the proponent of GHP should follow (b), hence
giving up on the acyclicity of partial grounding. Cases of symmetric meta-
physical dependence plausibly support this solution; compare the following
example given by Elizabeth Barnes:
The event WWII contains many smaller events – some insignificant
(such as a particular lighting of a cigar by Winston Churchill) some
much more significant (such as the evacuation of Dunkirk). And while
WWII might have been the same event without that particular lighting
of Churchill’s cigar, it’s plausible that WWII just wouldn’t have been
the same event without the evacuation at Dunkirk. Without the evac-
uation at Dunkirk, it literally would have been a different war -— the
evacuation is an essential part of the war. But, similarly, we might think
that being a part of WWII is essential to the evacuation of Dunkirk.
Sure, you could have a duplicate of that event that doesn’t take place
in the wider context of WWII. But that duplicate isn’t the evacuation
at Dunkirk – part of what it is to be the evacuation at Dunkirk is to
be a part of WWII13.
Donalson’s proposal is therefore that each instance of HP corresponds to a
legitimate claim of grounding, regardless of whether that instance entails that
there are circles of partial grounding14.
(a) requires by contrast that we distinguish between legitimate instances
of HP, which correspond to claims of grounding, and illegitimate ones, which
do not correspond to such claims. There are indeed many cases in which GHP
seems both plausible and unproblematic; it is natural to think, for example,
that the number of Flamingo species is the same as the number of Welsh
cities in virtue of the fact that those species and those cities can be paired
one-to-one. One might therefore argue that a a given instance of HP might
correspond to a statement of grounding, but only provided that some extra
13[Bar18, 60].
14In fact, Donaldson’s suggestion on the behalf of the proponent of GHP is that she should
both restrict UNIVERSAL GROUNDING and give up on the acyclicity of grounding.
Donaldson’s proposal is therefore a combination of (b) and (c); however, (c) alone does
not prevent the insurgence of auto-abstraction (see below).
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conditions are met (where, crucially, those conditions might result in a ban of
auto-abstraction)15.
Let’s briefly consider the pros and cons of these two strategies. An advan-
tage of the first strategy is that the proponent of GHP need not distinguish
between instances of HP that correspond to claims of grounding and instances
that don’t. The cost of adopting (a) is however that this strategy is burdened
by a commitment to cycles of partial ground. By contrast, an advantage of
the second strategy is that it can be made consistent with the acyclicity of
partial grounding; the proponents of (b) might indeed argue that the instances
of HP that would give rise to cases of auto-abstraction don’t correspond to
genuine claims of grounding. At the same time, (b) comes with a substan-
tial cost, namely that of specifying under which conditions an instance of HP
corresponds to a claim of grounding.
Which solution should be preferred? I will now argue that this issue can
be settled by considerations of metaphysical priority.
The aristotelian plausibly argues that at least in ordinary cases, relations
of equinumerosity between concepts are more fundamental than identities be-
tween cardinal numbers, and, in particular, that the right-hand side of an
instance of HP, which states that the F ’s and the G’s can be paired one-to-
one, is metaphysically prior to its left-hand side, which states that that the
cardinal numbers of those F ’s and those G’s are identical. I will refer to this
as the priority thesis:
PRIORITY: The right-hand side of an instance of an abstraction
principle is metaphysically prior to its left-hand side.
For example, according to the aristotelian the fact that the species of Flamingo
can be paired one-to-one with the cites in Wales might be metaphysically prior
to the fact that the number of those species is identical with the number of
those cities.
Moreover, the aristotelian is likely to take GHP as a way of specifying
PRIORITY. Priority and grounding are indeed two related notions. More pre-
cisely, grounding relations are supposed to be anti-reflexive, anti-symmetric,
and transitive. Therefore, those relations determine a strict partial order over
facts. Assuming that the right-hand side of an instance of HP grounds the left-
hand side, the left-hand side is not grounded, in its turn, by the right-hand
side.
Let’s go back to auto-abstraction. As seen, GHP implies that the left-hand
side of (1) is fully grounded by its left-hand side, and, at the same time,
that the right-hand side is partially grounded by the left-hand side. Therefore,
anyone who accepts that the right-to-left direction of (1) is a legitimate claim
of grounding must give up on the anti-symmetry of partial grounding (and, if
transitivity holds, on irreflexivity as well). At the same time, anyone who gives
up on anti-symmetry plausibly gives up on the connection between grounding
and priority; in the words of Barnes,
15For a similar approach cf. [Lin18, 43, fn. 41], who claims that the right-to-left direction of
abstraction principles correspond to “grounding potentials”.
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relations of priority . . . are, insofar as I have any grip on them, plausibly
asymmetric. And that is because they need to be asymmetric in order
to do the work we want them to do. These are relations that are intro-
duced in an attempt to take us from the derivative (the constructed,
the grounded, the non-fundamental) down toward the bedrock (the ul-
timate grounds, the fundamental, the basic). . . . Their asymmetry is
built into the work we want them to do – it’s part of what they are
for16.
Let’s finally go back to the choice between (a) and (b). A further cost of (b)
is that it seemingly forces the proponent of GHP to give up on PRIORITY.
(a), by contrast, does not require one to give up on the anti-symmetry of
grounding; therefore, PRIORITY seemingly tells in favour of strategy (a)17.
4 Independence
Under which conditions does an instance of an abstraction principle count as
a legitimate claim of grounding?
By assumption, the left-hand side of an AP is fully grounded, if any18, by
its left-hand side. Auto-abstraction phenomena show, however, then in some
cases the right-hand side is partially grounded by the left-hand side, and so
that the left-hand side is mediately grounded by itself, in contradiction with
PRIORITY. A natural constraint to be imposed is therefore as follows:
INDEPENDENCE: The right-hand side of an instance of an AP
must be independent of its left-hand side, i.e. the right-hand side
must not be partially grounded by the left-hand side.
Our discussion will proceed in terms of this notion of independence; so, instead
of asking:
(Q) Which instances of an AP are legitimate claims of grounding?
we will ask:
(Q ′) Which instances of an AP are such that their right-hand side is
independent of their left-hand side?
It is natural to formulate possible responses to (Q ′) as restrictions on the right-
hand side of HP. We will consider three increasingly strong implementations
of INDEPENDENCE:
16[Bar18, 54].
17Alternatively, the aristotelian might argue that it is not the theoretical role of the notion of
grounding to lead one from the fundamental to the derivative; cf. e.g. [Bar18, 67-8]. More
in general, the aristotelian could consider the notion of fundamentality as a primitive; cf.
[Wil14, §IV.i, VI.ii].
18An anonymous reviewer at Synthese pointed out to me that some might take identity
facts to be zero-grounded instead, i.e. grounded by an empty set of facts; cf. e.g. [Fin16].
I will not consider this option here.
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(A) The right-hand side of an AP must not make reference to either Abs(α) or
Abs(β);
(B) The right-hand side of an AP must not make reference to abstract objects
of the same kind as Abs(α) and Abs(β);
(C) The right-hand side of an AP must neither refer to nor quantify over ab-
stract objects of the same kind as Abs(α) and Abs(β).
We will now consider these three implementations in their turn.
(A) requires that the right of an AP does not refer to the particular abstract
objects that are introduced on its left. This requirement can be understood in
two ways:
(a) the singular terms ‘Abs(α)’ and ‘Abs(β)’ must not feature on the right-
hand side;
(b) the right-hand side must not contain any singular term which refers to
either Abs(α) or Abs(β).
As regards (a), consider the following instance of HP:
#(H) = #(px = #(H)q)↔ H ≈ px = #(H)q (H)
(H) states that the number of the concept H is identical with the number of
the things identical with the number of H just in case H and the concept
identical with the number of H are equinumerous. (H) is circular because the
term ‘#(H)’ appears on both sides of the biconditional. By contrast, the case
of auto-abstraction mentioned above, namely
#(px = 1q) = #(px = 1q)↔ px = 1q ≈ px = 1q, (1)
violates (b), since ‘1’ and ‘#(px = 1q)’ both refer to the same cardinal number,
namely one.
(B) requires in addition that the right-hand side does not refer to abstract
objects at all. Consider the following instance of HP:
#(px = 1∨x = 82q) = #(px = 1∨x = 82q)↔ px = 1∨x = 82q ≈ px = 1∨x = 82q
(2)
(2) states that the fact that the number of the things identical with either
1 or 82 is identical with itself is grounded by the fact that those things can
be paired one-to-one with themselves. Note that both (a) and (b) above are
satisfied; however, (2) gives rise to a case of auto-abstraction. There are indeed
exactly two things that are identical with either 1 or 82; therefore, the left-
hand side of (2) is just [2 = 2]. At the same time, the right-hand side of (2)
is partially grounded by the identity of each thing that is identical with either
1 or 82, and so by both [1 = 1] and [82 = 82]. However, 82 can be defined
as the cardinal number of all its predecessors, i.e. as the cardinal number of
px = 0 ∨ x = 1 ∨ . . . x = 82q. GHP then entails that [82 = 82] is partially
grounded by [2 = 2], and so that [2 = 2] is partially grounded by itself.
(C) finally requires that that the right-hand side must not quantify over
abstract objects. Recall that a first-order universal quantification is partially
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grounded by each one of their instances. Now consider [0 = 0]. This iden-
tity is plausibly grounded by the fact that any concept with no instances is
equinumerous with itself. Let’s consider the concept non-self-identical, whose
extension is (necessarily) empty. The corresponding instance of HP is:
#(px 6= xq) = #(px 6= xq)↔ px 6= xq ≈ px 6= xq (0)
The fact expressed on the right-hand side of (0), namely
[∃R (∀x (x 6= x→ ∃!y (y 6= y∧R(x, y)))∧∀x (x 6= x→ ∃!y (y 6= y∧R(y, x))))]
is partially grounded by
[∀x (x 6= x→ ∃!y (y 6= y ∧ S(x, y))) ∧ ∀x (x 6= x→ ∃!y (y 6= y ∧ S(y, x)))]
for each one-to-one correspondence relation S between non-self-identical and
itself. Since this latter fact involves a first-order universal quantification, it is
partially grounded by
[1 6= 1→ ∃!y (y 6= 1 ∧ S(x, y))) ∧ 1 6= 1→ ∃!y (y 6= y ∧ S(y, 1))]]
Both the conjuncts of this fact are material conditionals with false antecedents.
Therefore, the right-hand side of (0) is partially grounded by [1 6= 1], which is
plausibly grounded in its turn by [1 = 1]. Therefore, GHP entails that [0 = 0]
(or, for that matter, any other numerical identity) is partially grounded by [1
= 1] (and by any other numerical identity whatsoever).
In order to avoid this regress, Donaldson relies on a form of restricted
quantification. He writes
(∀x : F (x))(G(x)) (∃x : F (x))(G(x))
for ‘every x which is an F is a G’ and ‘some x which is an F is a G’ respec-
tively19. He then introduce the following rule for restricted first-order universal
quantification:
UNIVERSAL GROUNDING*: If (∀x : F (x))(G(x)), infer: [(∀x :
F (x))(G(x))] is fully grounded by the set of facts of the form
[(G(x))], where x is an F .
Finally, Donaldson defines ‘SimpleF,G’ a relation R(x, y) such that the first
relatum is an F and the second relatum is a G; he then restates GHP as
follows:
For all x, y, F,G, if x = #(F ) and y = #(G) and x = y, then
each one of the facts [#(F ) = #(G)], [x = #(F )], [y = #(G)]
and [x = y] is fully grounded by [(∃R : SimpleF,G(R)(F ≈ G)]
19As Donaldson points out, “when you utter ‘∀x : Owl(x))(Wise(x))’ you say of the owls
that they are wise. When you utter ‘∀x (Owl(x) → Wise(x))’, you say, of each thing
that exists, that if it is an owl then it is wise” ([Don17, 788-9; modified for exposition
purposes]).
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Following UNIVERSAL GROUNDING* and Donaldson’s restatement of GHP,
[0 = 0] is grounded by
[∃R ((∀x x 6= x)(∃!y 6= y)(R(x, y)) ∧ (∀x x 6= x)(∃!y : y 6= y)(R(y, x))))]
Since nothing is non-self-identical, Donaldson contends that [0 = 0] is zero-
grounded, i.e. grounded in an empty set of facts ([Don17, 789-90]).
However, UNIVERSAL GROUNDING* does not avoid auto-abstraction
completely. Consider for example the following cases:
Consider the [concept] of being one of Celia’s favourite things. There
are five things which have this property, one of which is the number
five. Now consider the [concept] of being a prime number less than six.
There are three things which have this property, one of which is the
number three20.
Even once UNIVERSAL GROUNDING* is taken on board, Donaldson’s mod-
ification of GHP would imply in this cases that [5 = 5] and [3 = 3] are partially
grounded by themselves.
Donaldson notes that auto-abstraction emerges when the number of a con-
cept F is itself an F . He calls ‘autoarithmetic’ the concepts with this property.
So why not restrict GHP to the concepts that are not autoarithmetic in Don-
aldson’s sense? Note however that the concept identical with 1 ∨ identical
with 82 is not autoarithmetic, but, as seen above, it still gives rise to a case
of auto-abstraction21.
Generalized auto-abstraction is in fact due to the impredicativity exhibited
by abstraction principles like HP. An abstraction principle is impredicative
if the objects that are purportedly denoted by the terms that feature on its
left-hand side are included in the range of some quantifier that occurs on
its right-hand side, and predicative otherwise. As long as impredicativity is
allowed, it will always be an open possibility that some identities between
abstract objects are at least partially grounded by themselves. Therefore, a way
of avoiding auto-abstraction (and circularity in general) would be to restrict
GHP to the predicative instances of HP, hence adopting the strongest one of
the three implementations that we examined in this section, namely
PREDICATIVITY: The right-hand side of a legitimate instance
of HP must not quantify over cardinal numbers.
Compliance with PREDICATIVITY ensures that GHP complies with INDE-
PENDENCE, and so with PRIORITY as well.
Note that PREDICATIVITY amounts to a qualified variant of strategy
(c), namely:
(c) weakening UNIVERSAL GROUNDING.
20[Don17, 786].
21An anonymous reviewer at Synthese noted that Donaldson’s ‘Celia’ case really shows that
it is a contingent matter which instances of the right-hand side of HP are independent, in
the relevant sense, of their left-hand side; I think that this remark further supports the
solution to the problem of auto-abstraction that I suggest in the next section.
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In particular, the proponent of GHP might retain UNIVERSAL GROUND-
ING as it is, while she adopts PREDICATIVITY and the other restrictions
listed by Donaldson to the effect that the universal quantifiers on the right of
HP are grounded only in their predicative instances. Doing so would allow one
to implement strategy (a), thus giving up on the claim that each instance of
HP corresponds to a genuine claim of grounding, without having to embark
on strategy (b), thus preserving the irreflexivity of grounding.
As seen, the aristotelian is plausibly committed to PRIORITY. However,
there is a sense in which PREDICATIVITY would pull the rug under the aris-
totelian’s feet. In light of Frege’s Theorem, according to which all the standard
axioms of Peano Arithmetic can be derived from HP alone, GHP promises “to
yield an account of what grounds a very wide variety of arithmetical facts”
([Don17, 784]). However, predicative Frege Arithmetic, i.e. the second-order
logical theory with predicative Hume’s Principle as its sole non-logical axiom,
falls short of proving full Peano Arithmetic, but proves only Robinson Arith-
metic Q instead. Therefore, if the aristotelian is willing to preserve PRIORITY,
and so the philosophical significance of GHP, then she must give up on her
convincement that GHP can provide a metaphysical foundation for arithmeti-
cal truths; vice versa, if GHP must be apt to provide such foundation, then
the aristotelian is apparently forced to at least partly drop INDEPENDENCE
by giving up on PREDICATIVITY22.
5 Predicativity
Let’s consider (1) again. GHP entails that the left-hand side of (1), namely
1 = 1, is partially grounded by itself. However, GHP also implies that [1 =
1] is grounded in other and independent ways. For example, 1 is the cardinal
number of the concept identical with 0. The corresponding instance of HP is
as follows:
#(px = 0q) = #(px = 0q)↔ px = 0q ≈ px = 0q (1*)
Following Donaldson’s restatement, the right-hand side of (1*) is grounded by
[0 = 0] alone, which is zero-grounded in its turn. Therefore, unlike (1), (1*)
does not entail that [1 = 1] is partially grounded by itself.
Note that the equinumerosity of two concepts is a matter of those concepts’
being isomorphic. By contrast, the identity of the specific objects falling under
those concepts is in a sense irrelevant to the fact that those concepts are
equinumeorus. Suppose for example that F is autoarithmetic in Donaldson’s
sense, and let n be its number. GHP then entails that [n = n] is partially
grounded by itself. However, it would always be possible to find a different
concept G such that F ≈ G, and so n = #(G), but n is not itself a G. GHP
22An option that we do not consider here consists in departing from abstraction principles
as conceived of by neo-Fregeans and by Donaldson alike by taking abstraction to expand
the domain into a larger one; cf. [Lin18].
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would then entail that [n = n] is partially grounded by [a = a] for each G(a),
where, crucially, a 6= n.
We can therefore distinguish between two cases of auto-abstraction, which
I propose to label ‘essential’ and ‘inessential’ respectively. Let a fact be es-
sentially grounded in another fact if, provided that there are multiple ways
in which the former fact is (fully) grounded, the latter fact invariably helps
grounding the former; that is, the grounding fact figures among the grounded
fact’s grounds for each way in which the grounded fact is (fully) grounded. By
contrast, let a fact be inessentially grounded by another fact if even though
the latter does ground the former, there are some ways in which the grounded
fact is (fully) grounded which does not include that particular grounding fact.
For example, the left-hand side of an instance of an AP is essentially
grounded by its right-hand side if the identity a1 = a2 that features on the
left of that instance invariably obtains in virtue of the obtaining of the cor-
responding equivalence relation α ∼ β that features on its right. By contrast,
the left-hand side is inessentially grounded by the right-hand side if some of
the ways in which a1 = a2 is grounded do not involve α ∼ β. Vice versa, the
right-hand side is essentially grounded by the left-hand side if α ∼ β invariably
obtains in virtue of a1 = a2, and inessentially grounded by the left-hand side
otherwise.
Since, by assumption, the right-hand side fully grounds the left-hand side,
then if the left-hand side is essentially grounded by the right-hand side, and
the right-hand side is essentially grounded by the left-hand side, then the left-
hand side is essentially grounded by itself. We will say that the left-hand side
is essentially auto-abstracted in this case. By contrast, even if the right-hand
side is grounded by the left-hand side, the left-hand side itself is inessentially
auto-abstracted if either the right-hand side inessentially grounds the left-hand
side, or the left-hand side inessentially grounds the right-hand side.
Given Donaldson’s refinements of GHP, moreover, the right-hand side of an
instance of HP is grounded by the left-hand side if it is essentially grounded by
the left-hand side at all. Suppose indeed that F ≈ G, and let n be the number
of F . Then, if [F ≈ G] is grounded by [n = n], it will be so because either F (n)
or G(n). Since [F ≈ G] is fully grounded by the obtaining of some relation of
one-to-one correspondence between the F ’s and the G’s, any such relation will
therefore involve facts about n. By contrast the left-hand side of an instance
of HP might be inessentially grounded by the right-hand side. For example, if
there are exactly six species of Flamingo and six cities in Wales, Donaldson’s
version of GHP implies that [6 = 6] is grounded by facts that concern those
cities and those species alone. However, other collection of exactly six things,
say the collection of six’s predecessors including zero, would have done in their
place.
I will now argue that this distinction between essential and inessential cases
motivates a natural solution to the problem of auto-abstraction.
Suppose that GHP implies the left-hand side of an instance of HP is
grounded by itself, but that the relevant numerical identity is not essentially
auto-abstracted. In this case, there would be a perfectly good metaphysical ex-
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planation of why the left-hand side holds which does not mention the truth of
right-hand side. In this case the relevant identity between cardinal numbers is
available independently of the right-hand side. Provided that that same iden-
tity is also independently and ultimately grounded by facts that are entirely
non-mathematical, the aristotelian can seemingly accept that the left-hand
side is grounded by itself without offending against her naturalism, since no
matter whether the left-hand side is grounded by itself, it is also grounded in
other and independent ways.
Suppose by contrast that the left-hand side is essentially auto-abstracted.
Then each way in which the relevant numerical identity is grounded would
involve reliance on that identity itself; a fortiori, some facts about numbers
would be ultimately grounded in facts involving (the same) numbers, con-
trary to the aristotelian intuition that mathematical facts are grounded in
non-mathematical ones. So while inessential autoabstraction might be toler-
ated, essential auto-abstraction cannot be accepted without giving up on on
aristotelianism altogether.
Recall that if the right-hand side is grounded by the left-hand side, then the
right-hand side is essentially grounded by the left-hand side. At the same time,
essential auto-abstraction is unacceptable, while inessential auto-abstraction
isn’t. The proponent of GHP should therefore adopt the following principle:
AUTO-ABSTRACTION PRINCIPLE: Auto-abstraction can be
tolerated unless the left-hand side is essentially grounded by the
right-hand side.
This principle has consequences for all the cases of auto-abstraction mentioned
so far. As seen, [1 = 1] is ultimately zero-grounded; therefore, (1) turns out
to be acceptable. Let’s now move to (2). Even if [2 = 2] is grounded by both
[1 = 1] and [82 = 82], and this latter is grounded in its turn by [2 = 2], 2 is
the cardinal number of the concept identical with 0 ∨ identical with 1, and so
GHP entails that [2 = 2] is grounded by [1 = 1] and [0 = 0] (and so by 0 = 0
alone). We can therefore deem (2) as acceptable as well. Finally, even if Celia
has exactly five favourite things, and the cardinal number five is one of them,
[5 = 5] is also grounded in facts involving for example all the predecessors of
five, which do not include five itself; similarly, [3 = 3] is grounded by [2 = 2],
[1 = 1], and [0 = 0], and so by [0 = 0] alone.
The AUTO-ABSTRACTION PRINCIPLE has also consequences for pred-
icativity in general. As seen, the independence constraint motivates predica-
tive restrictions on the acceptable instances of GHP. Note however that each
(finite) cardinal number can be defined as the cardinal number of all its pre-
decessors including zero. As seen, 1 can be defined as the cardinal number of
the concept identical with 0, and 2 can be defined as the number of identical
with 0 ∨ identical with 1 ; 3 can be defined as the number of identical with
0 ∨ identical with 1 ∨ identical with 2, and so on. Given Donaldson’s refine-
ments of GHP, each finite cardinal number is grounded by [0 = 0], and so
ultimately zero-grounded. Since quantification on those numbers on the left
of HP is sufficient to derive the standard axioms of Dedekind-Peano Arith-
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metic, the AUTO-ABSTRACTION PRINCIPLE restores GHP’s promise to
deliver an account of the metaphysical foundations of “a very wide variety” of
arithmetical facts.
Finally, the AUTO-ABSTRACTION PRINCIPLE has consequences for
aristotelianism at large. Recall that the aristotelian is plausibly committed
to the thesis that the right-hand side of an instance of HP is metaphysically
prior to the left-hand side. I argued above that the AUTO-ABSTRACTION
PRINCIPLE entails that quantification over at least finite cardinal numbers
should be tolerated, in violation of PREDICATIVITY. Since PREDICATIV-
ITY is violated, the AUTO-ABSTRACTION PRINCIPLE makes room for
cases in which the right-hand side is grounded by the left-hand side, in vio-
lation of INDEPENDENCE. The violation of INDEPENDENCE leads to the
straightforward violation of PRIORITY: provided that the left-hand side is
not essentially auto-abstracted, some numerical identities will be grounded by
themselves. However, even though in those cases the right-hand is not indepen-
dent of, and consequently prior to, the left-hand side, there is a different kind
of independence that is preserved, that this, the left-hand side would still be
available independently of the right-hand side. If the AUTO-ABSTRACTION
PRINCIPLE is enforced, however, to allow those apparently problematic in-
stances of HP would not result in more arithmetical identities than the ones
that we would have got hadn’t we allowed such instances23
6 Auto-abstraction and the Puzzles of Ground
Recall that one of the three strategies, (c), consists in weakening UNIVERSAL
GROUNDING.
UNIVERSAL GROUNDING might indeed appear to some as problematic
in itself. For example, let F be the fact that everything exists. The fact that F
exists is plausibly grounded by everything’s existing, since F is the fact that
everything exists. At the same time, UNIVERSAL GROUNDING entails that
everything exists partly in virtue of F’s existing. Therefore, everything exists
partially in virtue of everything’s existing, in contradiction with grounding
irreflexivity24.
Fine contends that puzzles like this highlight “a conflict between a deeply
entrenched logical view, on the one side, and extremely plausible metaphysical
views, on the other side” ([Fin10, 105]). As regards logic, it is a standard
logical theorem that everything exists. As regards metaphysics, Fine mentions
two views, namely Complex Ground, i.e. the view that every logically complex
truth should have a ground, and Classicality, i.e. the view that those ground,
23Note the solution to the problem of auto-abstraction that I developed in this section bears
close resemblance to Wright’s defence of the impredicativity of HP; cf. [Wri97], [Wri98],
[Wri99].
24Even though Fine’s own version of the puzzles of ground rests on a number of assumption,
[Kra13] formulates the same puzzle in such a way as a contradiction is derived from
irreflexivity and (an higher-order version of) UNIVERSAL GROUNDING alone.
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if any, should be in conformity with the classical truth-conditions; together,
those two views support UNIVERSAL GROUNDING. Fine then proceeds to
examine various ways in which both classical logic and the logic of ground can
be weakened in order to solve the puzzles.
Fine briefly considers whether irreflexivity could be dropped instead; how-
ever he claims that
there is . . . a plausible demand on ground or explanation that we are
unable to evade. Given a truth that stands in need of explanation,
one naturally supposes that it should have a “completely satisfactory”
explanation, one that does not involve cycles and terminates in truths
that do not stand in need of explanation25.
[Lit15, 449] notes that “on the assumption that every truth has a completely
satisfactory explanation, it follows that this notion of ground satisfies Noncir-
cularity”. Suppose indeed that there is a putative explanation of A in terms of
A itself; arguably, the explanation thereby provided would not be “completely
satisfactory”, since it contains a cycle involving A.
Litland grants that, even if A is partly explained by A, A might admit of
an independent explanation – that is, an explanation that does not involve
A itself. Inessential auto-abstraction is of course a case like this; for example,
even though the right-hand side of (1) grounds its left-hand side, there is also
an independent explanation of why 1 = 1 holds. Litland argues however that
“if one has already given a satisfactory explanation of why A is the case,
one does not in any way improve from that explanation by going on from A
to explain it again” ([Lit15, 499-500, modified for exposition purposes]). One
might argue that once 1 = 1 has been given a satisfactory explanation, there is
not point in considering (1) as a claim of grounding. At the same time, 1 = 1
still explain why #(px = 1q) = #(px = 1q). So one might restrict Donaldson’s
restatement of GHP in such a way that, if F ≈ G and n = #(F ), but n = n
is already available, then [F ≈ G] grounds [#(F ) = #(G)] but not [n = n].
By contrast, both [Cor13] and [Woo18] give up on irreflexivity. Correia
suggests that if some independently plausible views about what grounds what,
in conjunction with the equally plausible principle that grounding is transitive,
entail that grounding is non-reflexive, then we should consider these cases as
counterexamples to grounding irreflexivity ([Cor13, 55]).
Woods claims that “grounding is not irreflexive, but it is substantively ir-
reflexive – it is never the case that something is non-vacuously grounded in
itself”, where some facts occur vacuously among the grounds of some other
fact if “their particular content does no substantive work in grounding the
grounded fact” ([Woo18, 2]). For example, the fact that everything exists, F,
vacuously grounds everything’s existing because any other fact would have
done in place of F. Woods argues that while circles of non-vacuous ground-
ing are in principle unacceptable, reflexive vacuous ground can be accepted




Woods’s notion of vacuous grounds bears close resemblance to my notion
of inessential auto-abstraction. Note that the RHS does not occur vacuously in
the grounds of the left-hand side in Woods sense, since not any fact whatsoever
would do in place of the equinumerosity of F and G. For that matter, not even
any equinumerosity fact whatsoever would do in place of a particular instance
of the right-hand side: for example, even if Celia’s five favourite things are
equinumerous with the predecessors of 6 including zero, this fact does not
ground [6 = 6]. However, there is a restricted sense in which the right-hand
side occurs vacuously among the grounds of the left-hand side, namely with
respect to each concept equinumerous with one of the concepts involved in
[F ≈ G]. For example, [6 = 6] is grounded by the fact that there are as
many species of Flamingo as there are cities in Wales; however, [6 = 6] is also
grounded by the fact that those species are equinumerous with the G’s, for
any G with exactly six instances.
Moreover, [Fin10, 104] suggests that
as a general matter A would not be a ground, either immediate or
mediate, for A but there might be special cases in which A in one
capacity, so to speak, was a ground for A in another capacity.
Woods claims that the notion of vacuous ground helps clarifying how “special
cases” of reflexive grounding are possible, since vacuous occurences of a fact
in its own grounds are cases in which a fact “in one capacity”, and specifically
in a guise such that the particular content of that fact is not relevant to the
grounded fact, grounds the same fact “in another capacity”, and specifically
in a guise such that its content does matter. My notion of inessential auto-
abstraction is similarly close to Fine’s dictum. Recall indeed that even if n =
#(F ), the identity of every particular F -thing is irrelevant to [n = n]. The
corresponding instance of GHP would just imply that [n = n] is grounded
in facts involving collections of exactly n things, no matter whether some of
those collections contain the number n itself.
Finally, [Lov19] takes the (reflexive) notion of weak ground as a primitive26,
and derives from it principles for strict ground (roughly: A strictly grounds B
if A weakly grounds B and B not even weakly helps grounding A). This leads
to a neat and unified solution to most of the puzzles of ground explored in the
literature.
As Fine notes, the puzzles of ground require that one reaches a “reflec-
tive equilibrium” between principles that are individually plausible but which
are in conflict with each other ([Fin10, 97]). Equilibrium can be achieved in
several different ways. However, I think that there is a principled reason to
drop grounding irreflexivity (as I suggest in this paper) rather than UNIVER-
SAL GROUNDING or even classical logic, that is, that classical logic and
also UNIVERSAL GROUNDING enjoy an independent plausibility, while ir-
reflexivity is supported only by paradigmatic cases of grounding. If some of
those cases entail that grounding is non-irreflexive, then the most conservative
modification of one’s metaphysical view would be to give up on irreflexivity.
26Similarly to [Fin12].
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Finally, it worth noting that unlike all the extant approaches to the puz-
zles of ground, I propose a restriction on the acceptable instances of ground-
theoretic abstraction principles. This isn’t what people usually do in the de-
bate on the puzzles of ground, since none of those puzzles officially involves
abstraction principles. This also means that my solution is less general than
at least most of the proposed solutions to the puzzles of ground. However, this
paper’s aim was not to give a general solution to those puzzles, but only to
suggest what the proponents of GHP, and the aristotelian more in general,
should think about auto-abstraction27.
7 Conclusions
Let me end up by comparing my solution with strategies (a) and (b). Under
which conditions is auto-abstraction acceptable? Strategy (a) requires that
ground-theoretic abstraction principles are restricted in such a way as to avoid
any case of auto-abstraction whatsoever. Against (a), I argued that auto-
abstraction is acceptable unless the left-hand side is essentially grounded by
the left-hand side. By contrast, strategy (b) requires to give up on irreflexivity
altogether. Against (b), I argue that even once irreflexivity is dropped, cases
of essential auto-abstraction remain problematic.
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